CHAPTER 5
Asian Perspectives: Indian Theories of Mind

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Abstract

This chapter examines Indian views of the mind and consciousness, with particular focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition. To contextualize Buddhist views of the mind, we first provide a brief presentation of some of the most important Hindu views, particularly those of the Sāṃkhya school. Whereas this school assumes the existence of a real transcendent self, the Buddhist view is that mental activity and consciousness function on their own without such a self. We focus on the phenomenological and epistemological aspects of this no-self view of the mind. We first discuss the Buddhist Abhidharma and its analysis of the mind in terms of awareness and mental factors. The Abhidharma is mainly phenomenological; it does not present an epistemological analysis of the structure of mental states and the way they relate to their objects. To cover this topic we turn to Dharmakīrti, one of the main Buddhist epistemologists, who offers a comprehensive view of the types of cognition and their relation to their objects.

Introduction

In discussing Asian views of mind and consciousness, we must start from the realization that this topic presents insurmountable challenges. The diversity of Asian cultures from China to India to Iran is so great that it is impossible to find coherent ways to discuss the mental concepts of these cultures over and above listing these conceptions and noting their differences. Hence, rather than chart a territory that hopelessly extends our capacities, we have chosen to examine Indian views of the mind, with a special focus on the Indian Buddhist tradition, which can be traced back to the first centuries after the life of Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha (566–483 BCE), and which continued to develop in India through the 7th and 8th centuries CE. This approach allows us to present a more grounded and coherent view of the mind as conceived in the Indian philosophical tradition and to indicate some areas of interest that this tradition offers to cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind.
In talking about the mind, it is important to define the term, for it is far from unambiguous. In most Indian traditions, the mind is neither a brain structure nor a mechanism for treating information. Rather, mind is conceived as a complex cognitive process consisting of a succession of related mental states. These states are at least in principle phenomenologically available; that is, they can be observed by attending to the way in which we experience feeling, perceiving, thinking, remembering, and so on. Indian thinkers describe these mental states as cognizing (jñā) or being aware (buddh) of their object. Thus, the mind is broadly conceived by traditional Indian thinkers as constituted by a series of mental states that cognize their objects.

This general agreement breaks down quickly, however, when we turn to a more detailed analysis of the nature and structure of the mind, a topic on which various schools entertain vastly different views. Some of these disagreements relate to the ontological status of mental states and the way they relate to other phenomena, particularly physical ones. Such disagreements are related to well-known ideas in the Western tradition, particularly the mind-body dualism that has concerned Western philosophy since Descartes. But many of the views entertained by Indian thinkers are not easily mapped in Western terms, as we see in this chapter.

Most Indian thinkers do not consider the ontological status of mental states to be a particularly difficult question, for most of them accept that there is an extra-physical reality. Among all the schools, only the Materialist, the Cārvāka, reduces the mental to physical events. For its proponents, mental states do not have any autonomous ontological status and can be completely reduced to physical processes. They are just properties of the body, much like the inebriating property of beer is a property of beer. Most other thinkers reject this view forcefully and argue that the mind can neither be eliminated nor reduced to the material. Their endorsement of an extra-physical reality does not, however, necessarily amount to a classical mind-body dualism (of the sort found in Descartes' *Meditations* or Plato's *Phaedo*). Moreover, although they agree in rejecting the materialist view, they strongly disagree in their presentations of the mind.

In this chapter, we focus mostly on the Buddhist tradition, exploring some of its views of the mind. One of the most salient features of this tradition is that its accounts of the mind and consciousness do not posit the existence of a self. According to this tradition, there is no self, and mental activity cannot be understood properly as long as one believes in a self. The Hindu tradition, by contrast, maintains that mental life does involve a permanent self. Thus, to contextualize Buddhist views of the mind, we begin with a brief presentation of some of the most important Hindu views. We then present the Buddhist Abhidharma and its analysis of the mind in terms of awareness and mental factors. Traditionally, the Abhidharma makes up one of the 'three baskets' into which Buddhists divide their scriptures - Sutra or sayings of the Buddha, Vinaya or monastic discipline, and Abhidharma, which systematizes Buddhist teachings in the form of detailed analyses of experience. In examining the Abhidharma, we examine the ways in which this tradition analyzes the different functions of the mind without positing the existence of a self. These analyses are in certain ways reminiscent of those in cognitive science that aim to account for cognitive processing without invoking a homunculus or 'little man' inside the head who oversees the workings of the mind (or merely passively witnesses the results; see Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, for further discussion of this parallel). The Abhidharma, however, is phenomenological; its concern is to discern how the mind works as evidenced by experience (but especially by mentally disciplined and refined contemplative experience). Although thus it is also epistemological, the Abhidharma does not present any developed epistemological analysis of the structure of mental states and the way they relate to their objects so as to produce knowledge. To cover this topic we turn to
Dharmakīrti (c. 600 CE), one of the main Buddhist epistemologists, who offers a comprehensive view of the types of cognition and their relation to their objects.

The phenomenological analyses contained in the Abhidharma and the epistemological analyses of Dharmakīrti offer significant resources for cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind in their efforts to gain a better understanding of consciousness. These analyses also constitute the theoretical framework for the ways in which the Buddhist tradition conceives of meditation and mental training, both with regard to the phenomenology of contemplative mental states and the epistemology of the types of knowledge that these states are said to provide. Given the increasing scientific interest in the physiological correlates and effects of meditation and their relation to consciousness (see Chapter 19), it is important for the scientific community to appreciate the phenomenological and philosophical precision with which these states are conceptualized in the Buddhist tradition.

Self and Mental States: A Sāṃkhya View

One of the most important views of the mind in the Hindu tradition is found in the Sāṃkhya school. Traditionally this school is said to have been founded by the philosopher Kapila, a legendary figure who may have lived as early as the 7th century BCE, but the earliest Sāṃkhya text we possess dates from the 3rd century CE. The Sāṃkhya tradition is one of the six classical schools of Hindu philosophy (Nyaya, Vaiṣeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and Vedānta). Its influence extends to the other schools, particularly the Vedānta school, which later became especially important in the development of Hindu thought. The Sāṃkhya was in fact less a school proper than a way of thinking based on the categorization of reality. It was crucial in the formation of Indian philosophical thinking before and after the start of the Common Era, and hence it is unsurprising that its view of the mind has been largely adopted in the Hindu tradition and beyond.

The Sāṃkhya approach rests on a dualistic metaphysics built on the opposition between material primordial nature (pradhāna) or materiality (prakṛti) and a spiritual self (ātman) or person (puruṣa). Nature is the universal material substratum out of which all phenomena other than the self emerge and evolve. These phenomena, which make up the world of diversity, are physical transformations of the three qualities (guna) that compose primordial nature. These three qualities are sattva (transparency, buoyancy), rajas (energy, activity), and tamas (inertia, obstruction). They are principles or forces, rather than building blocks. All material phenomena, including the intellect and organs of perception, are understood to be made up of a combination of these three principles. The one principle not included in this constant process of transformation is the self, which is permanent, non-material, and conscious or aware. The self is also described as the conscious presence that witnesses the transformations of nature, but does not participate in them. As such it is passive, though it witnesses the experiences deriving from the transformations of the world of diversity.

Although the Sāṃkhya analysis of mind is dualistic, it does not fit within classical mind-body dualism. For the Sāṃkhya, the mind involves a non-material spiritual element, namely the self. The self, however, is not the same as the mind. Rather, the self is the mere presence to or pure witnessing of the mental activities involved in the ordinary awareness of objects. This pure witnessing, untainted by the diversity of the material world, is not sufficient for mental activities, for mental activities are representational or semantic and require more than passive mirroring. Mental activity is the apprehension of an object, and this activity requires active engagement with objects and the formation of ideas and concepts necessary for purposeful action in the world. The self cannot account for such activity, however, because it is changeless and hence passive. To account for our cognitive activities,
we therefore need other elements that participate in the world of diversity. Because any element that participates in the world of change must emerge out of primordial materiality and hence be material, it follows that the analysis of mental states cannot be limited to their spiritual dimension (the self), but must also involve material elements. Hence, for the Sāṃkhya, mental activity requires the cooperation of the two fundamental types of substance that make up the universe, passive consciousness and material nature.

Having described the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, we can now sketch its influential analysis of mental activity. This analysis starts with buddhi, which is usually translated as ‘the intellect’ and is the ability to distinguish and experience objects. This ability provides the prereflective and presubjective ground out of which determined mental states and their objects arise; it is also the locus of all the fundamental predispositions that lead to these experiences. The intellect emerges out of primordial matter and therefore is active, unlike the non-material and passive self. The self is described metaphorically as a light, for it passively illuminates objects, making it possible for the intellect to distinguish them. The intellect operates in a representational way by taking on the form of what is known. This representational ability works in two directions – toward the conscious and uninvolved self and toward the objects. The intellect, thanks to its quality of clarity and translucence (sattva), takes on the form of the self by reflecting it. As a result, it seems as if the self experiences the diversity of objects, when it is actually the intellect that undergoes these experiences, the self being the mere witness of them. This ability of the intellect to usurp the function of consciousness helps the intellect in its apprehension of objects, for by itself the intellect is active but unconscious. Awareness of objects arises only when the intellect takes on the light of the self and reflects it on objects, much like pictures are created when light is projected onto a film. In this way, the intellect becomes able to take on the form of the object and thus to discern it.

The intellect’s reflecting the self and taking on the form of an object are not, however, sufficient to fully determine experience. To become fully cognitive, experience requires the formation of subjective and objective poles. Experience needs to be the experience of a particular individual apprehending a particular object. The formation of the subjective pole is the function of the ‘ego-sense’ (ahamkāra), the sense of individual subjectivity or selfhood tied to embodiment. This sense colors most of our experiences, which involve a sense of being a subject opposed to an object. The determination of the objective pole, on the other hand, is the function of ‘mentation’ (manas), which oversees the senses and whose special function is discrimination. This function allows mentation to serve as an intermediary between the intellect and the senses. Mentation organizes sensory impressions and objects and integrates them into a temporal framework created by memories and expectations. In this way, our experience of objects in the world is created.

Although the dualistic metaphysics associated with this view was rejected in the history of Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhya model of the mind was taken over by other Hindu schools. It serves as a foundation of the philosopher Patañjali’s (c. 2nd century BCE) Yoga view of mind, which is similar to the Sāṃkhya. The Yoga view also rests on the opposition between passive self and active mental activities (citā), a rubric under which intellect, ego-sense, and mentation are grouped. Similarly, Īśkara (788–820 CE), who savaged the dualism of the Sāṃkhya, took over its model of the mind in his Advaita Vedānta, emphasizing the contrast between the transcendence of the self and the mental activities of the ‘inner sense’ (antahkarana) belonging to the person. Hence, the Sāṃkhya view can be taken as representative of the Hindu view of the mind, especially in its emphasis on the difference between a passive witnessing consciousness and mental activity.

According to this view, as we have seen, mental events come about through the conjunction of two heterogeneous factors – a
transcendent self and a diversity of mental activities. It is a basic presupposition of the Hindu tradition that mental life involves a permanent self. Yet because mental life also undeniably involves change, it cannot be reduced to this single, motionless factor of the self; hence the need for the complicated analysis briefly summarized here. This tension in accounts of the mind and consciousness between identity and change, unity and diversity, is of course also prevalent throughout Western philosophy and persists in cognitive science. We turn now to the Buddhist tradition, which presents a different perspective on this issue.

The Abhidharma Tradition and its View of the Mind

The Buddhist tradition is based on the opposite view of no-self (anātman). For the Buddhists, there is no self, and hence mental activity is not in the service of such an entity, but rather functions on its own. In short, for the Buddhists there is no self that is aware of the experiences one undergoes or the thoughts one has. Rather the thoughts themselves are the thinker, and the experiences the experiencer.

How, then, do Buddhists explain the complexities of the mind? How do they explain mental regularities if there is no central controller to oversee the whole process?

For an answer, we turn to the Abhidharma, one of the oldest Buddhist traditions, which can be traced back to the first centuries after the Buddha (566-483 BCE). First elaborated as lists, the Abhidharma contains the earlier texts in which Buddhist concepts were developed and hence is the source of most philosophical developments in Indian Buddhism. But the Abhidharma is not limited to this role as a source of Buddhist philosophical development. It remained a vital focus of Buddhist thought and kept evolving, at least until the 7th or 8th century CE. In this chapter, we focus on two Indian thinkers from the 4th or 5th century CE, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, and ignore the diversity of opinions and debates that has animated this tradition.

The object of the Abhidharma is to analyze both the realm of sentient experience and the world given in such experience into its components in language that avoids the postulation of a unified subject. This analysis concerns the whole range of phenomena, from material phenomena to nirvana (the state of enlightenment, understood as the direct realization of the nature of reality, including especially the lack of any essential self and the consequent liberation from suffering). For example, there are elaborate discussions of the four primary and four secondary elements that make up matter (see de la Vallée Poussin, 1971, I: 22). There are also lengthy treatments of the nature, scope, and types of soteriological practices prescribed by the Buddhist tradition, a central focus of the Abhidharma. But a large part of the Abhidharmic discourse focuses on the analysis of mental phenomena and their various components. It is this part of the Abhidharma that we examine in this chapter.

In considering experience, the Abhidharma proceeds in a rather characteristic way that may be disconcerting for newcomers, but reflects its historical origin as mnemonic lists of elements abstracted from the Buddha’s discourses. For each type of phenomenon considered, the Abhidharma analyzes it into its basic elements (dharma), lists these elements, and groups them into the appropriate categories (examples are given below). The study of the Abhidharma thus often revolves around the consideration of series of extended lists.

In elaborating such lists of components of experience and the world given in experience, the Abhidharma follows the central tenets of Buddhist philosophy, in particular the twin ideas of non-substantiality and dependent origination. According to this philosophy, the phenomena given in experience are not unitary and stable substances, but complex and fleeting formations of basic elements that arise in dependence on complex causal nexuses. Such non-substantiality is particularly true of the person, who is not a substantial self, but a changing construct
dependent on complex configurations of mental and material components. This analysis, which is diametrically opposed to the Sāṃkhya view, is not just limited to the person, but is applied to other objects.

All composite things are thus analyzed as being constituted of more basic elements. Moreover, and this point is crucial, these basic elements should not be thought of as reified or stable entities, but as dynamically related momentary events instantaneously coming into and going out of existence. Thus, when the Abhidharma analyzes matter as being made up of basic components, it thinks of those components not as stable particles or little grains of matter, but rather as fleeting material events, coming into and going out of existence depending on causes and conditions. Similarly, the mind is analyzed into its basic components; namely, the basic types of events that make up the complex phenomenon we call 'mind'.

This Abhidharmic analysis is not just philosophical but it also has practical import. Its aim is to support the soteriological practices that the Buddhist tradition recommends. The lists of material and mental events are used by practitioners to inform and enhance their practices. For example, the list of mental factors we examine shortly is a precious aid to various types of meditation, providing a clear idea of which factors need to be developed and which are to be eliminated. In this way, the Abhidharma functions not just as the source of Buddhist philosophy but also informs and supports the practices central to this tradition.

In the Abhidharma the mind is conceived as a complex cognitive process consisting of a succession of related momentary mental states. These states are phenomenologically available, at least in principle: They can be observed by turning inward and attending to the way we feel, perceive, think, remember, and so on. When we do so, we notice a variety of states of awareness, and we also notice that these states change rapidly. It is these mental states arising in quick succession that the Abhidharma identifies as being the basic elements of the mind.

It should be clear from this preliminary characterization that in elaborating a theory of the mind the Abhidharma relies primarily on what we would call a first-person approach. It is by looking directly at experience that we gain an understanding of mind, not by studying it as an object and attending to its external manifestations. This approach of the Abhidharma is not unlike that of such Western thinkers as James, Brentano, and Husserl, who all agree that the study of the mind must be based on attention to experience (see Chapter 4). This approach is well captured by James's famous claim that in the study of the mind, "Introspective Observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost and always" (James, 1981, p. 185).

As James himself recognizes, however, first-person observation of the mind, although it might seem a straightforward enterprise, is not a simple affair and raises numerous questions. What does it mean to observe the mind? Who observes? What is being observed? Is the observation direct or mediated? In addition to these difficult epistemological issues (some of which we take up in the next section), there are also questions about the reliability of observation. We are all able to certain degrees to observe our own minds, but it is clear that our capacities to do so differ. Whose observations are to be considered reliable? This question is significant for the Abhidharmists, who may include in their data not only ordinary observations but also the observations of trained meditators. This inclusion of observation based on contemplative mental training and meditative experience marks an important difference between the Abhidharma and James, as well as other Western phenomenologists. Nevertheless, the degree to which meditative experience is relevant to Buddhist theories of the mind is not a straightforward matter, as we see shortly.

The comparison between the Abhidharma and James goes further, however, than their reliance on an introspective method. They also share some substantive similarities, the most important of which is perhaps the idea of the stream of consciousness.
For the Abhidharma, mental states do not arise in isolation from each other. Rather, each state arises in dependence on preceding moments and gives rise to further moments, thus forming a mental stream or continuum (santāna, rgyud), much like James’s ‘stream of thought’. This metaphor is also found in the Buddhist tradition in which the Buddha is portrayed as saying, “The river never stops: there is no moment, no minute, no hour when the river stops: in the same way, the flux of thought” (de la Vallée Poussin, 1991, p. 69, translation from the French by Dreyfus).

Unsurprisingly, there are also significant differences between James and the Abhidharma. One difference of interest to contemporary research is the issue of whether mental states arise in continuity or not (see Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, pp. 72–79). James’s view is well known: “Consciousness does not appear to itself chopped up in bits” (James, 1981, p. 233). Although the content of consciousness changes, we experience these changes as smooth and continuous, without any apparent break. The Abhidharma disagrees, arguing that although the mind is rapidly changing, its transformation is discontinuous. It is only to the untrained observer that the mind appears to flow continuously. According to the Abhidharma, a deeper observation reveals that the stream of consciousness is made up of moments of awareness, moments that can be introspectively individuated and described.

Several Abhidharma texts even offer measurements of this moment, measurements one would expect to be based on empirical observation. Yet such claims are problematic, for different Abhidharma traditions make claims that at times are strikingly at odds with one another. For example, the Mahāvibhāṣā, an important text from the first centuries of the Common Era, states that there are 120 basic moments in an instant. The text further illustrates the duration of an instant by equating it to the time needed by an average spinner to grab a thread. Not at all, argues another text: This measurement is too coarse. A moment is the 64th part of the time necessary to click one’s fingers or blink an eye (see de la Vallée Poussin, 1991, pp. 70–71). Although these measurements differ, one could argue that given the imprecision of premodern measurement, there is a rough agreement between these accounts, which present a moment of awareness as lasting for about 1/100th of a second. This is already significantly faster than psychophysical and electrophysiological estimates of the duration of a moment of awareness as being on the order of 250 milliseconds or a quarter of a second (see Pöppel, 1988; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991, pp. 72–79). But consider the claim made by a Theravada Abhidharma text that “in the time it takes for lightning to flash or the eyes to blink, billions of mind-moments can elapse” (Bodhi, 1993, p. 156). The time scale in this account, which is standard in the Theravada tradition, is faster by many orders of magnitude.

This dramatic discrepancy alerts us to some of the difficulties of accounts based on observation. For whom are we to believe? On which tradition should we rely? Moreover, we cannot but wonder about the sources of these differences. Do they derive from the observations of meditators, or are they the results of theoretical elaborations? It is hard to come to a definitive conclusion, but it seems reasonable to believe that these accounts are not simply empirical observations, but largely theoretical discussions, perhaps supplemented by observation reports. Hence one must be cautious and not assume that these texts reflect empirical findings. Although some may, they are mostly theoretical elaborations, which cannot be taken at face value, but require critical interpretation. Finally, another Abhidharma text seems to muddy the waters further by claiming that the measure of a moment is beyond the understanding of ordinary beings. Only enlightened beings can measure the duration of a moment (de la Vallée Poussin, 1991, p. 73). Thus it is not surprising that we are left wondering!

According to the Abhidharma, the mental episodes that compose a stream of consciousness take as their objects either real or
fictional entities. This object-directed character of mind has been called 'intentionality' by Western philosophers, such as Brentano and Husserl. Brentano claimed that intentionality is an essential feature of consciousness and proposed it as a criterion of the mental. All acts of awareness are directed toward or refer to an object, regardless of whether this object is existent or not. We cannot think, wish, or dread unless our mind is directed toward something thought about, wished for, or dreaded, which thus appears to the mind. Therefore, to be aware is for something to appear to the mind. The Abhidharma seems to share this view, holding that every moment of cognition relates to particular objects, and hence it assumes that intentionality and consciousness are inseparable.8

The Abhidharma also holds that this stream of consciousness is not material. It is associated with the body during this lifetime, but will come to exist in dependence on other bodies after the death of this body. It is crucial to recognize, however, that the immaterial stream of consciousness is not a soul in the Platonic or Cartesian sense, but an impersonal series of mental events. Buddhist philosophers do not believe in an ontology of substances – that reality comprises the existence of independent entities that are the subjects of attributes or properties. Rather, they argue that reality is made up of events consisting of a succession of moments. Thus, mind and matter are not substances, but evanescent events, and mental and material events interact in a constantly ongoing and fluctuating process. Moreover, Buddhist philosophers partake of the general Indian reluctance to separate the mental and the material. Hence they do not hold that the divide between the material and mental spheres is absolute. Nevertheless, for the Buddhists, in contrast to the Sāṃkhya, there is a sharp divide between the mental, which is intentional and conscious, and other elements. In this respect, Buddhists are perhaps the closest among Indian philosophers to a classical mind-body dualism.

The Abhidharma, however, does not stop at a view of the mind as a succession of mental states, but goes much further in its analysis, breaking down each mental state into its components. According to the Abhidharma schema, which is to our knowledge unique, each mental state is analyzed as having two aspects: (i) the primary factor of awareness (citta), whose function is to be aware of the object, and (ii) mental factors (caitesika), whose function is to qualify this awareness by determining its qualitative nature as pleasant or unpleasant, focused or unfocused, calm or agitated, positive or negative, and so on. The philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 4th or 5th century CE), one of the great Abhidharmists, explains this distinction between awareness and mental factors as follows:

Cognition or awareness apprehends the thing itself, and just that; mental factors or dharmas associated with cognition such as sensation, etc., apprehend special characteristics, special conditions (de la Vallée Poussin, 1971, I: 30).9

The basic insight is that mental states have two types of cognitive functions – (1) awareness and (2) cognitive and affective engagement and characterization. The mental state is aware of an object. For example, the sense of smell is aware of a sweet object. But mental states are not just states of awareness. They are not passive mirrors in which objects are reflected. Rather, they actively engage their objects, apprehending them as pleasant or unpleasant, approaching them with particular intentions, and so forth. For example, a gustatory cognition of a sweet object is not just aware of the sweet taste but also apprehends the object as pleasant, distinguishes certain qualities such as its texture, and so on. It also categorizes the object as being (say) one's favorite Swiss chocolate. Such characterization of the object is the function of the mental factors. We now describe this distinction between the primary factor of awareness and mental factors in more detail.

The Primary Factor of Awareness

The primary factor of awareness (citta) is also described as vijnana, a term often
translated as consciousness or cognitive awareness. It is the aspect of the mental state that is aware of the object. It is the very activity of cognizing the object, not an instrument in the service of an agent or self (which, as we have seen, the Buddhist philosophers argue is nonexistent). This awareness merely discerns the object, as in the above example where one apprehends the taste of what turns out to be one's favorite Swiss chocolate. Thus Vasubandhu speaks of awareness as the "bare apprehension of each object" (de la Vallée Poussin, 1971, I: 30).

In most Abhidharma systems, there are six types of awareness: five born from the five physical senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch) and mental cognition. Each type of sensory cognition is produced in dependence on a sensory basis (one of the five physical senses) and an object. This awareness arises momentarily and ceases immediately, to be replaced by another moment of awareness, and so on. The sixth type of awareness is mental. It is considered a sense by the Abhidharma, like the five physical senses, though there are disagreements about its basis (see Guenther, 1976, pp. 20–30).

Some Abhidharma texts, such as Asaṅga’s (Rahula, 1980), argue that these six types of consciousness do not exhaust all the possible forms of awareness. To this list Asaṅga adds two types of awareness: the store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, kun gzhi rnam shes) and afflictive mentation (kliṣṭa-manas, nyon yid; Rahula, 1980, p. 17). The idea of a store-consciousness is based on a distinction between the six types of awareness, which are all described as manifest cognitive awareness (pravṛtti-vijñāna, ‘jug shes), and a more continuous and less manifest form of awareness, which is the store-consciousness. This awareness is invoked to answer the following objection: If there is no self and the mind is just a succession of mental states, then how can there be any continuity in our mental life? Asaṅga’s answer is that there is a more continuous form of consciousness, which is still momentary, but exists at all times. Because it is subliminal, we usually do not notice it. It is only in special circumstances, such as fainting, that its presence can be noticed or at least inferred. This consciousness contains all the basic habits, tendencies, and propensities (including those that persist from one life to the next) accumulated by the individual. It thus provides a greater degree of continuity than manifest cognitive awareness on its own.

The store-consciousness is mistaken by the afflictive mentation as being a self. In this way one’s core inborn sense of self is formed. From a Buddhist point of view, however, this sense of self is fundamentally mistaken. It is a mental imposition of unity where there is in fact only the arising of a multiplicity of interrelated physical and mental events. The sense of control belonging to one’s sense of self is thus largely illusory. There is really nobody in charge of the physical and mental processes, which arise according to their own causes and conditions, not our whims. The mind is not ruled by a central unit, but by competing factors whose strength varies according to circumstances.

Thus Asaṅga, allegedly Vasubandhu’s half-brother, posits as many as eight types of consciousness, a doctrine usually associated with a particular Buddhist school, the Yogācāra. This school contains many interesting insights, without which there is no complete understanding of the depth of Buddhist views of the mind, but there is not space to discuss these insights here. Let us simply point out that there are some interesting similarities between the Yogācāra and the Śaṅkhya views. The store-consciousness, in acting as the holder of all the potentialities accumulated by an individual, is not unlike the intellect (buddhi), whereas the afflictive mentation seems similar to the ego-sense (ahaṁkāra). Furthermore, mental cognition does not seem too different from mentation (manas). These similarities indicate the reach of the Śaṅkhya model, even in a tradition whose basic outlook is radically different.

Mental Factors
Mental states are not just states of awareness; they also actively engage their objects,
qualifying them as pleasant or unpleasant, approaching them with a particular attitude, and so on. Mental factors, which are aspects of the mental state that characterize the object of awareness, account for this engagement. In other words, whereas consciousness makes known the mere presence of the object, mental factors make known the particulars of the content of awareness, defining the characteristics and special conditions of its object. They qualify the apprehension of the object as being pleasant or unpleasant, attentive or distracted, peaceful or agitated, and so forth.

The translation of these elements of the mind (caitesika) as factors is meant to capture the range of meanings that the Abhidharma associates with this term. The relation between cognitive awareness and mental factors is complex. At times the Abhidharma construes this relation diachronically as being causal and functional. Factors cause the mind to apprehend objects in particular ways. At other times, the Abhidharma seems to emphasize a synchronic perspective in which cognitive awareness and mental factors coexist and cooperate in the same cognitive task.¹¹

In accordance with its procedure, the Abhidharma studies mental factors by listing them, establishing the ways in which they arise and cease, and grouping them in the appropriate categories. Each Abhidharma tradition has a slightly different list. Here we follow a list of 51 mental factors distributed in 6 groups.¹² The mental typology presented in this list has a number of interesting features in relation to more familiar Western philosophical and scientific typologies:

- Five omnipresent factors: feeling, discernment, intention, attention, and contact
- Five determining factors: aspiration, appreciation, mindfulness, concentration, and intelligence
- Four variable factors: sleep, regret, investigation, and analysis
- Eleven virtuous factors: confidence/faith, self-regarding shame, other-regarding shame, joyful effort, pliability, conscientiousness, detachment, non-hatred (lovingkindness), wisdom, equanimity, and non-harmfulness (compassion).
- Six root-afflictions: attachment, anger, ignorance, pride, negative doubt, and mistaken view.
- Twenty branch-afflictions: belligerence, vengefulness, concealment, spite, jealousy, avarice, pretense, dissimulation, self-satisfaction, cruelty, self-regarding shamelessness, other-regarding shamelessness, inconsideration, mental dullness, distraction, excitement, lack of confidence/faith, laziness, lack of conscientiousness, and forgetfulness.

The nature of this complex typology becomes clearer when one realizes that these six groups can be further reduced to three. The first three groups contain all the neutral factors. They are the factors that can be present in any mental state, whether positive or negative. Hence these factors are neither positive nor negative in and of themselves. The next three groups are different. These factors are ethically determined. The eleven virtuous factors are positive in that they do not compel us toward attitudes that lead to suffering. They leave us undisturbed, open to encounter reality with a more relaxed and freer outlook. The twenty-six afflic- tive factors, on the other hand, disturb the mind, creating frustration and restlessness. They are the main obstacles to the life of the good as understood by the Buddhist tradition. The very presence of these factors marks the mental state as virtuous or afflicative. Thus it is clear that the Abhidharma typology is explicitly ethical.

This presentation also offers interesting insights concerning the cognitive functions of the mind. In particular, the analysis of the five omnipresent factors – feeling, discernment, intention, attention, and contact – shows some of the complexities of Abhidharmic thinking. These five are described as omnipresent because they are present in every mental state. Even in a subliminal state such as the store-consciousness these five factors are present. The other factors are not necessary for the performance of the most minimal cognitive task (the apprehension of
an object, however dimly and indistinctly). Hence they are not present in all mental states, but only in some.

One striking feature of this list is the pre-eminent place of feeling (vedāna, tshor ba) as the first of the factors. This emphasis reflects the fundamental outlook of the tradition, which views humans as being first and foremost sentient. But it also reflects a distinctive view of the cognitive realm that emphasizes the role of spontaneous value attribution. For the Abhidharma, a mental state is not only aware of an object but at the same time it also evaluates this object. This evaluation is the function of the feeling tone that accompanies the awareness and experiences of the object as either pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral. This factor is central in determining our reactions to the events we encounter, because, for the most part, we do not perceive an object and then feel good or bad about it out of considerate judgments. Rather, evaluation is already built into our experiences. We may use reflection to come to more objective judgments, but those mostly operate as correctives to our spontaneous evaluations.

Feeling is not the only important factor, however. A mental state involves not only awareness and feeling but also discernment (samjñā, du shes also often translated as perception or recognition). This factor involves the mind’s ability to identify the object by distinguishing it from other objects. This concept of discernment presents some difficulties, however. In its most elaborate form, discernment is based on our semiotic ability to make distinctions, mostly through linguistic signs. But for the Abhidharma, the mind’s ability to identify objects is not limited to linguistic distinctions, however important they may be. Infants and non-human animals are understood to have the ability to make distinctions, although they do not use symbolic thinking. Are these prelinguistic cognitions nevertheless semiotic? Do they involve non-linguistic signs, or do they make distinctions without the use of signs? It seems plausible to argue that some of these states involve non-linguistic signs, as in the case of visual cognitions that distinguish objects on the basis of visual clues. For the Abhidharma, however, this question strikes deeper, because several meditative states in the Buddhist tradition are described as signless (ani-mitta, mthal med). Can the mind in these states identify its object without making distinctions? Or is it the case that even in the case of signless states the mind still makes distinctions, although they are not linguistic or even conceptual? In a short chapter such as this one, we cannot delve into this issue, despite its relevance to the dialogue between Buddhism and the sciences of mind.

Other factors are also significant. Intention (cetāna, sems pa) is a central and omnipresent factor, which determines the moral (not ethical) character of the mental state. Every mental state approaches its object with an intention, a motivation that may be evident to the person or not. This intention determines the moral nature of the mental state, whether it is virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral. This factor is associated with the accomplishment of a goal and hence is also thought of as a focus of organization for the other factors.

Also important is the role of attention (manasikāra, yid la byed pa), another one of the five omnipresent factors. It is the ability of the mind to be directed to an object. A contemporary commentator explains attention this way: “Attention is the mental factor responsible for the mind’s adoration to the object, by virtue of which the object is made present to consciousness. Its characteristic is the conducting of the associated mental states [i.e., factors] to the object. Its function is to yoke the associated mental states [i.e., factors] to the object” (Bodhi, 1993, p. 81). Every mental state has at least a minimal amount of focus on its object; hence attention is an omnipresent factor.

Attention needs to be distinguished from two other related factors. The first is concentration (samādhi, ting nge ’dzin), the ability of the mind to dwell on its object single-pointedly. The second is mindfulness (smṛti, dran pa, also translated as recollection), which is the mind’s ability to keep the object in focus without forgetting, being distracted, wobbling, or floating away from the object.
Both abilities are not present in every mental state. Concentration differs from attention in that it involves the ability of the mind not just to attend to an object but also to sustain this attention over a period of time. Similarly, mindfulness is more than the simple attending to the object. It involves the capacity of the mind to hold the object in its focus, preventing it from slipping away in forgetfulness. Hence both factors, which are vital to the practice of Buddhist meditation (see Chapter 19), are included among the determining factors. They are present only when the object is apprehended with some degree of clarity and sustained focus.

The factors discussed so far are mainly cognitive, but the Abhidharma list also includes mental factors we would describe as emotions. Consider the ethically determined factors, starting with the eleven virtuous ones: confidence/faith, self-regarding shame, other-regarding shame, joyful effort, pliability, conscientiousness, detachment, non-hatred (lovingkindness), wisdom, equanimity, and non-harmfulness (compassion).

We would describe several of these factors, such as lovingkindness and compassion, as emotions. These two factors belong to what we would characterize as the affective domain, although here they are understood not with regard to their affectivity, but rather in relation to their ethical character. Hence they are grouped with other factors, such as wisdom and conscientiousness, that are more cognitive than affective. For the Abhidharma all these factors are grouped together. They are all positive in that they promote well-being and freedom from the inner compulsions that lead to suffering.

The affective factors, on the other hand, are precisely those that lead to suffering. They are by far the most numerous group and are clearly a major focus of this typology:

- Six root-afflictions: attachment, anger, ignorance, pride, negative doubt, and mistaken view.
- Twenty branch-afflictions: belligerence, vengefulness, concealment, spite, jealousy, avarice, pretense, dissimulation, self-satisfaction, cruelty, self-regarding shamelessness, other-regarding shamelessness, inconsideration, mental dullness, distraction, excitement, lack of confidence/faith, laziness, lack of conscientiousness, and forgetfulness.

Here again we notice that this list contains factors that look quite different. Some factors such as ignorance are clearly cognitive, whereas others such as anger and jealousy are more affective. They are grouped together because they are affective: They trouble the mind, making it restless and agitated. They also compel and bind the mind, preventing one from developing more positive attitudes. This affective character may be obvious in the case of attachment and jealousy, which directly lead to dissatisfaction, frustration, and restlessness. Ignorance—that is, our innate and mistaken sense of self—is less obviously affective, but its role is nonetheless central here, because it brings about the other more obviously affective factors.

Although there are many elements in the typology of mental factors that we can identify as emotions (anger, pride, jealousy, lovingkindness, and compassion), there is no category that maps onto our notion of emotion. Most of the positive factors are not what we would call emotions, and although most of the negative factors are affective, not all are. Hence it is clear that the Abhidharma does not recognize the notion of emotion as a distinct category of a mental typology. There is no Abhidharma category that can be used to translate our concept of emotion, and similarly our concept of emotion is difficult to use to translate the Abhidharma terminology. Rather than opposing rational and irrational elements of the psyche, or cognitive and emotive systems of the mind (or brain), the Abhidharma emphasizes the distinction between virtuous and affective mental factors. Thus, our familiar Western distinction between cognition and emotion simply does not map onto the Abhidharma typology. Although the cognition/emotion
distinction has recently been called into question by some scientists (see Chapter 29 and Damasio, 1995), it remains central to most of contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind. The Abhidharma typology offers a different approach, one in which mental factors are categorized according to their ethical character. This typology could prove fruitful for psychologists and social and affective neuroscientists interested in studying the biobehavioral components of human well-being (see Goleman, 2003).

The analyses of mental factors we have reviewed indicate the complexity, sophistication, and uniqueness of the Abhidharma mental typology. For this reason, the Abhidharma is often called, somewhat misleadingly, 'Buddhist psychology'. Yet the Abhidharma analysis does not answer all the questions raised by the Buddhist view of the mind as lacking a real self. In particular, it leaves out the issue of the cognitive or epistemic structure of the mental states that make up the stream of consciousness. To examine this issue, we turn to another Indian Buddhist tradition, the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (see Dreyfus, 1997; Dunne, 2004).

Buddhist Epistemology

This tradition was started by Dignāga around 500 CE and was expanded significantly more than a century later by Dharmakīrti, the focus of our analysis. Its contribution was the explicit formulation of a complete Buddhist logical and epistemological system. The importance of this system in India can be seen in the continuous references to it by later Buddhist thinkers and the numerous attacks it received from orthodox Hindu thinkers. It gradually came to dominate the Indian Buddhist tradition, even eclipsing the Abhidharma as the prime focus of intellectual creativity.

The concern of this tradition is the nature of knowledge. In the Indian context, this issue is formulated as this question: What is the nature of valid cognition (pramāṇa) and what are its types? Hindu thinkers tend to present a realist theory, which liberally allows a diversity of instruments of valid cognition. For example, the Sāṃkhya asserts that there are three types of valid sources of knowledge: perception (pratyākṣa), inference (anumāṇa), and verbal testimony (śabda). The Nyāya, perhaps the most important Hindu logico-epistemological tradition, added a fourth type of valid cognition, analogy (upamāna). This fourfold typology provided the most authoritative epistemological typology in India. Buddhist epistemology, however, rejects these typologies and offers a more restrictive view, limiting knowledge to inference and perception. It is in its examination of inference as a source of knowledge that the Buddhist tradition analyzes reasoning, in particular the conditions necessary for the formation of sound reasons and all their possible types. Hence this tradition is often described, also somewhat misleadingly, as 'Buddhist logic'.

The interpretation of the word pramāṇa is itself a topic of debate among Buddhist and Hindu thinkers. For the latter, this word, in accordance with its grammatical form, refers to ‘means of valid cognition’. This understanding also accords with the basic view of this school that knowledge is owned by a subject, the self, to whom knowledge is ultimately conveyed. For example, the Nyāya asserts that knowledge is a quality of the self. It is only when I become conscious of something that I can be said to know it. This view is energetically rejected by Dharmakīrti, who follows the classical Buddhist line that there is no knowing self, only knowledge. Hence, pramāṇa should not be taken in an instrumental sense, but as referring to the knowledge-event, the word itself being then interpreted as meaning valid cognition. This type of cognition is in turn defined as that cognition that is non-deceptive (avisamvādi-jiṣāna):

Valid cognition is that cognition [that is] non-deceptive (avisamvādi). Non-deceptiveness [consists in the readiness
[for the object] to perform a function (Dharmakīrti, Commentary on Valid Cognition II: 1, translated by Dreyfus, in. Miyasaka, 1971–2).

This statement emphasizes that pramāṇa is not the instrument that a knowing self uses to know things. There is no separate knowing subject, but just knowledge, which is pramāṇa. According to this account, a cognition is valid if, and only if, it is non-deceptive. Dharmakīrti in turn interprets non-deceptiveness as consisting of an object's readiness to perform a function that relates to the way it is cognized. For example, the non-deceptiveness of a fire is its disposition to burn, and the non-deceptiveness of its perception is its apprehension as burning. This perception is non-deceptive because it practically corresponds to the object's own causal dispositions, contrary to the apprehension of the fire as cold.

The scope of the discussion of pramāṇa, however, is not limited to the analysis of knowledge, but constitutes a veritable philosophical method used in investigating other philosophical and even metaphysical topics. All pronouncements about the world and our ways of knowing it must rest on some attested forms of knowledge, such as perception and inference, if they are to be taken seriously. No one can simply claim truth, but must be able to establish statements by pinning down their epistemic supports. The advantage of this method is that it provides intertraditional standards of validation and the development of a relatively neutral framework within which philosophical and metaphysical claims can be assessed, without regard to religious or ideological backgrounds. This procedure is different from the Abhidharmic approach, which presupposes Buddhist ideas and vocabulary.

In analyzing the mind, Dharmakīrti starts from the same view of mind as the Abhidharma. Mind is made up of momentary mental states that arise in quick succession. Each moment of consciousness comes to be and disappears instantaneously, making a place for other moments of awareness. Moreover, each moment apprehends the object that appears to it and in the process reveals the object that is apprehended. In this way, each mental state cognizes its object. But as an epistemologist, Dharmakīrti investigates issues left out by the Abhidharma, tackling questions that are central to any philosophical exploration of the mind. In this chapter, we examine some of these questions. First, we consider Dharmakīrti's analysis of the nature of cognitive events. We examine his view of the mind as apprehending representations of external objects, rather than the objects themselves, and the consequences that this view has for the issue of whether the mind is inherently reflexive (self-revealing and self-aware). We also examine Dharmakīrti's theory of perception, as well as some of his views on the nature of conceptuality and its relation to language. Finally, we revisit the issue of intentionality, showing the complexity of this notion and attempting to disentangle its several possible meanings within the context of a Buddhist account of the mental.

The Reflexive Nature of Mental Events

We commonly assume that we have unproblematic access to our environment through our senses. Even casual first-person investigation shows, however, that such access may well not be the case. There are cases of perceptual illusions, and even when we are not deceived, the perceptions of individuals vary greatly. Hence philosophy cannot take for granted the common-sense view of perceptual knowledge. Many Western philosophers have argued that our perceptual knowledge goes well beyond the sensible experiences that give rise to it. Although this claim is debatable, we cannot assume without examination that we understand the way in which cognition apprehends its objects.

In thinking about the nature of cognition, Dharmakīrti relies crucially on the concept of aspect (ākāra), a notion that goes back to the Sāṃkhya, but has been accepted by several other schools. The idea behind this position, which is called in Indian philosophy sākāravāda ('assertion of aspect'), is that cognition does not apprehend its object
nakedly, but rather through an aspect, which is the reflection or imprint left by the object on the mind. For example, a visual sense consciousness does not directly perceive a blue color, but captures the likeness of blue as imprinted on cognition. Thus, to be aware of an object does not mean apprehending this object directly, but having a mental state that has the form of this object and being cognizant of this form. The aspect is the cognitive form or epistemic factor that allows us to distinguish mental episodes and differentiate among our experiences. Without aspects, we could not distinguish, for instance, a perception of blue from a perception of yellow, for we do not perceive yellow directly. The role of the aspect is thus crucial in Dharmakirti’s system, for it explains a key feature of consciousness: Consciousness is not the bare seeing that direct realism and common sense suppose, but rather the apprehension of an aspect that represents this object in the field of consciousness. The aspect is not external to consciousness. It is not only the form under which an external object presents itself to consciousness but also the form that consciousness assumes when it perceives its object. Thus an aspect is a representation of objects in consciousness, as well as the consciousness that sees this representation.

The implication of this analysis is that perception is inherently reflexive. Awareness takes on the form of an object and reveals that form by assuming it. Thus, in the process of revealing external things, cognition reveals itself. This view of cognition as ‘self-luminous’ (svayam prakāśa) and self-presencing is not unique to Dignāga, its first Buddhist propounder, or to Dharmakirti, his follower. It is also accepted by other thinkers, particularly the Hindu Vedāntins, who identify consciousness as the self and describe it as being ‘only known to itself’ (svayaṃvedya) and ‘self-effulgent’ (svayaṃprabha; see Gupta 1998, 2003; Mayeda, 1979/1992, pp. 22, 44). For Dignāga and Dharmakirti, however, the inherently reflexive character of consciousness is not a consequence of its transcendent and pure nature, but of its consisting of the beholding of an internal representation.

From one side, consciousness has an externally oriented feature, called the objective aspect (grāhāyakāra). This feature is the form that a mental state assumes under the influence of an external object. The second side is the internal knowledge of our own mental states. It is called the subjective aspect (grāhakākāra), the feature that ensures that we are aware of the objective aspect, the representation of the object. These two parts do not exist separately. Rather, each mental state consists of both and hence is necessarily reflexive (aware of itself in being aware of its object).

The necessary reflexivity of consciousness is understood by Dharmakirti and his followers as a particular type of perception called self-cognition (svasamvedana). Self-cognition can be compared to what Western philosophers call apperception; namely, the knowledge that we have of our own mental states. It is important to keep in mind, however, that apperception does not imply a second and separate cognition directed toward a given mental state of which one is thereby aware. For Dharmakirti, apperception is not introspective or reflective, for it does not take inner mental states as its objects. It is instead the self-cognizing factor inherent in every mental episode, which provides us with a non-thematic awareness of our mental states. For Dharmakirti, reflexivity is a necessary consequence of his analysis of perception, according to which a subjective aspect beholds an objective aspect that represents the external object within the field of consciousness. Self-cognition is nothing over and above this beholding.

Self-cognition is the intuitive presence that we feel we have toward our own mental episodes. We may not be fully aware of all the aspects and implications of our experiences, but we do seem to keep track of them. Tibetan scholars express this idea by saying that there is no person whose mental states are completely hidden to him- or herself. This limited self-presence is not due to a metaphysical self, but to self-cognition. Because apperception does not rely on reasoning, it is taken to be a form of perception.
Apperception does not constitute, however, a separate reflective or introspective cognition. Otherwise, the charge that the notion of apperception opens an infinite regress would be hard to avoid.

Dharmakīrti's ideas are not unlike those Western philosophers who have argued that consciousness implies self-consciousness (see Chapters 3 and 4). Such philosophers include (despite their otherwise vast differences) Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Husserl, and Sartre (see Wider, 1997, pp. 7–39). According to Locke, a person is conscious of his or her own mental states. He defines consciousness as "the perception of what passes in a man's mind" (Essay Concerning Human Understanding II: ii, 19). Leibniz, in his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (II: i, 19), criticizes Locke, pointing out that this view leads to an infinite regress, for if every cognitive act implies self-awareness, self-knowledge must also be accompanied by another awareness, and so on ad infinitum. This regress arises, however, only if knowledge of one's mental states is assumed to be distinct from knowledge of external objects. This assumption is precisely what Dharmakīrti denies. A consciousness is aware of itself in a non-dual way that does not involve the presence of a separate awareness of consciousness. The cognizing person simply knows that he or she cognizes without the intervention of a separate perception of the cognition. This knowledge is the function of apperception, which thus provides an element of certainty with respect to our mental states. Apperception does not necessarily validate these states, however. For example, one can take oneself to be seeing water without knowing whether that seeing is veridical. In this case, one knows that one has an experience, but one does not know that one knows. The determination of the validity of a cognition is not internal or intrinsic to that cognition, but is to be established by practical investigation.

Several arguments are presented by Dharmakīrti to establish the reflexive nature of consciousness. One of his main arguments concerns the nature of suffering and happiness as it reveals the deeper nature of mental states. For Dharmakīrti, as for the Abhidharma, suffering and happiness are not external to consciousness, but integral to our awareness of external objects. Our perceptions arise with a certain feeling-tone, be it pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral; this feeling-tone is a function of the presence of the mental factor of feeling as described by the Abhidharma. This feeling needs to be noticed, however; otherwise we would not be aware of how the apprehension of the object feels. Because this noticing cannot be the function of another mental state without incurring the problem of an infinite regress, it must be the mental state apprehending the external object that becomes aware at the same time of the feeling. This conclusion indicates, for Dharmakīrti, the dual nature of mental states. In a single mental state, two aspects can be distinguished: (1) the objective aspect, the representation of the external object in consciousness, and (2) the subjective aspect, the apprehension of this appearance or self-cognition.

For Dharmakīrti, a mental state thus has two functions. It apprehends an external object (alambana) and beholds itself. The apprehension of an external object is not direct, but results from the causal influence of the object, which induces cognition to experience (anubhava) the object's representation. Hence, mind does not experience an external object, but beholds an internal representation that stands for an external object. Cognition cannot be reduced to a process of direct observation, but involves a holding of an inner representation. This beholding is not, however, an apprehension in the usual sense of the word, for the two aspects of a single mental episode are not separate. It is an 'intimate' contact, a direct experiencing of the mental state by itself through which we become aware of our mental states at the same time as we perceive things.

**Theory of Perception**

This view of cognition as bearing only indirectly on external objects has obvious consequences for the theory of perception. The
theory of perception is an important element of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology, for we have access to external reality first and foremost through perception, the primary valid cognition. But this access is not as unproblematic as one might think. Although it might seem commonsensical that perception results from our encounter with the world, in reality consciousness does not directly cognize the object, but only indirectly cognizes it. For Dharmakīrti, as we have seen, the mind has direct access only to the representational *aspect* caused by the object; the object itself remains inaccessible to consciousness. The similarity between object and aspect – and hence between object and consciousness, the aspect being the cognitive form of the object that stands for the object in the field of consciousness – is the crucial element in this causal theory of perception. This similarity ensures that perception is not locked up in its own appearances, as conceptions are. Consciousness is not in direct contact with the external world, but only with an internal impression caused by the external object. Hence the external object remains hidden, though not completely.

When pressed by these problems, Dharmakīrti sometimes shifts between the views of two different Buddhist philosophical schools, using one perspective to bypass problems that arise in the other. These two views are the Sautrāntika theory of perception, which is representationalist in the ways just described, and the Yogācāra theory, which is idealist and denies that there is anything outside of consciousness. Following Dignāga’s example and his strategy of ascending scales of philosophical analysis, Dharmakīrti holds that the Yogācāra theory is truer and hence higher on the scale of analysis. This theory denies that there are any external objects over and above the direct objects of perception. Thus its view of perception is phenomenalist: it reduces external objects to interpreted mental data, but such data are no longer taken to stand for external objects (because it is now held that nothing exists outside of consciousness). This theory, however, is counter-intuitive, and so Dharmakīrti refers to it only occasionally, preferring to argue on the basis of the commonsensical assumption that external objects exist. His theory of perception thus has a peculiar two-tiered structure, in which he presupposes the existence of external objects, which he then ultimately rejects to profound a form of idealism.

Among these two tiers, the one Dharmakīrti most often refers to is the Sautrāntika representationalist theory of perception. According to this view, consciousness does not have direct access to external objects, but grasps objects via the intermediary of an aspect caused by and similar to an external object. He sometimes replaces this view by a Yogācāra view, which holds that internal impressions are not produced by external objects, but by internal tendencies. This shift into full-blown idealism allows Dharmakīrti to bypass the difficulties involved in explaining the relation between internal perceptions and external objects. Because there are no external objects, the problem of the relation between internal impressions and external objects does not arise. At this level, his philosophy of perception can be described as phenomenalist, for it holds that there is no external object outside of aspects.

Another major feature of Dharmakīrti’s account is his sharp separation between perception and conception, a separation enshrined in his definition of perception as the cognition that is unmistaken (*abhūrīta*) and free from conceptions (*kalpanāpadha*) (*Commentary on Valid Cognition*, III: 300 cd). Because perception is unmistaken and conception is mistaken, perception must be free from conception. This analysis of perception differs sharply from the dominant account in India, the epistemological realism of the Nyāya school and its assertion of the existence of a determinate (*savikalpaka*) form of perception. For the Nyāya, perception does not stop with the simple taking in of sensory stimuli, but also involves the ability to categorize this input. Although we may start with a first moment of indeterminate perception, in which we merely take in external reality, we do not stop there but go on to formulate perceptual judgments. Moreover, and this is the crux of the
question, these judgments are for the Nyāya fully perceptual. They are not mistaken conceptual overlays, but true reflections of reality.

This commonsensical view of perception is not acceptable to Dharmakīrti, for it leads to an unenviable choice: either accept the reality of the abstract entities necessary for the articulation of the content of perception or reject the possibility of an unmistaken cognition. Because neither possibility is acceptable for Dharmakīrti, he holds that perception can only be non-conceptual. There is no determinate perception, for the judgments induced by perception are not perceptual, but are just conceptual superimpositions. They do not reflect the individual reality of phenomena, but instead address their general characteristics. Because those are only constructs, the cognitions that conceive them cannot be true reflections of reality. Hence for perception to be undistorted in a universe of particulars, it must be totally free from conceptual elaborations. This position implies a radical separation between perception, which merely holds the object as it is in the perceptual ken, and interpretation of this object, which introduces conceptual constructs into the cognitive process.

This requirement that perception be non-conceptual is the cornerstone of the Buddhist theory of perception. But it creates problems for Dharmakīrti. It would seem that given his privileging of perception he should hold an empiricist view, according to which perception boils down to a bare encounter with reality and knowledge is given to the senses. Dharmakīrti should hold the view that the aspects through which we come to perceive reality are fully representational like Locke’s ideas, that they stand for external objects, and that their apprehension is in and of itself cognitive. Dharmakīrti’s view of perception, however, is more complex, for he shares with Sellars (1956) the recognition that knowledge, even at the perceptual level, does not boil down to an encounter with reality, but requires active categorization. We do not know things by sensing them, for perception does not deliver articulated objects, but only impressions, which by themselves are not forms of knowledge but become so only when they are integrated within our categorical schemes. For example, when we are hit on the head, we first have an impression. We just have a sensation of pain, which is not by itself cognitive. This sensation becomes cognitive when it becomes integrated into a conceptual scheme, in which it is explained as being an impact on a certain part of our body due to certain causes. It is only then that the impression of being hit becomes fully intentional. Prior to this cognitive integration, the impression, or to speak Dharmakīrti’s language, the aspect, does not yet represent anything in the full sense of the word. It only becomes so when interpreted conceptually.

This view of perception agrees with Dharmakīrti’s analysis of the validity of cognitions, which consists in their being ‘non-deceptive’, a term interpreted in practical terms. Cognitions are valid if, and only if, they have the ability to lead us toward successful practical actions. In the case of perception, however, practical validity is not as straightforward as one might think. Achieving practical purposes depends on correctly describing the objects we encounter. It is not enough to see an object that is blue; we must also see it as being blue. To be non-deceptive, a cognition depends on the appropriate identification of the object as being this or that. Perceptions, however, do not identify their objects, for they are not conceptual. They cannot categorize their objects, but only hold them without any determination. Categorization requires conceptual thought under the form of a judgment. Such a judgment subsumes its object under an appropriate universal, thereby making it part of the practical world where we deal with long-lasting entities that we conceive of as parts of a determined order of things. For example, we sense a blue object that we categorize as blue. The perceptual aspect (the blue aspect) is not yet a representation in the full sense of the word, because its apprehension, the perception of blue, is not yet cognitive. It is only when it is interpreted by a conception that the aspect becomes a full-fledged
intentional object standing for an external object. Hence, Dharmakīrti’s account of perception leads us to realize the importance of categorical interpretation in the formation of perceptual knowledge, a position that is not without problems for his system, given his emphasis on the primacy and non-conceptuality of perception. Nevertheless, the merit of this analysis is that it disentangles the processes through which we come to know the world, explaining the role of perception as a way to contact the world while emphasizing the role of conceptual categorization in the formation of practical knowledge.

Thought and Language

In examining thought (kalpanā), Dharmakīrti postulates a close association with language. In fact, the two can be considered equivalent from an epistemological point of view. Language signifies through conceptual mediation in the same way that thought conceives of things. The relation between the two also goes the other way: We do not first understand things independently of linguistic signs and then communicate this understanding to others. Dharmakīrti recognizes a cognitive import to language; through language we identify the particular things we encounter, and in this way we integrate the object into the meaningful world we have constructed. The cognitive import of language is particularly obvious in the acquisition of more complex concepts. In these cases, it is clear that there is nothing in experience that could possibly give rise to these concepts without language. Without linguistic signs thought cannot keep track of things to any degree of complexity. Dharmakīrti also notes that we usually remember things by recollecting the words associated with those things. Thus concepts and words mutually depend on each other.

This close connection between thought and language, inherited from Dignāga, differentiates Dharmakīrti from classical empiricists, such as Locke and modern sense-data theorists, who believe in what Sellars (1956) describes as the ‘myth of the given’. Locke, for example, holds that concepts and words are linked through association. The word ‘tree’ acquires its meaning by becoming connected with the idea tree, which is the mental image of a tree. Hence for Locke the representation of the tree is not formed through language, but is given to sensation (Dharmakīrti’s perception). We understand a tree as a tree through mere acquaintance with its representation without recourse to concepts. Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is quite different, for it emphasizes the constitutive and constructive nature of language. This conception of language is well captured by one of Dharmakīrti’s definitions of thought:

Conceptual cognition is that consciousness in which representation (literally, appearance) is fit to be associated which words (Ascertainment of Valid Cognition 40: 6–7, in Vetter, 1966).

Thought identifies its object by associating the representation of the object with a word. When we conceive of an object we do not apprehend it directly, but through the mediation of its aspect. Mediation through an aspect also occurs with perception, but here the process of mediation is different. In the case of perception there is a direct causal connection between the object and its representation, but no such link exists for thought. There is no direct causal link between the object and thought, but rather an extended process of mediation in which linguistic signs figure prominently.

For Dharmakīrti, the starting point of this process is our encounter with a variety of objects that we experience as being similar or different. We construct concepts in association with linguistic signs to capture this sense of experienced similarity and difference. This linguistic association creates a more precise concept in which the representations are made to stand for a commonality that the objects are assumed to possess. For example, we see a variety of trees and apprehend a similarity between these objects. At this level, our mental representations have yet to yield a concept of tree. The concept of tree is formed when we connect our
representations with a socially formed and communicated sign and assume that they stand for a treeness that we take individual trees to share. In this way experiences give rise to mental representations, which are transformed into concepts by association with a linguistic sign. The formation of a concept consists of the assumption that mental representations stand for an agreed-upon imagined commonality. Thus concepts come to be through the conjunction of the experience of real objects and the social process of language acquisition. Concept formation is connected to reality, albeit in a mediated and highly indirect way.

But concept formation is also mistaken, according to this view. A concept is based on the association of a mental representation with a term that enables the representation to stand for a property assumed to be shared by various individuals. In Dharmakirti’s nominalist world of individuals, however, things do not share a common property; rather, the property is projected onto them. The property is manufactured when a representation is made to stand for an assumed commonality, which a variety of individuals are mistakenly taken to instantiate. Hence this property is not real; it is merely a pseudo-entity superimposed (adhyāropa) on individual realities. This property is also not reducible to a general term. In other words, the commonality that we project onto things does not reside in using the same term to designate discrete individuals. Upon analyzing the notion of sameness of terms, we realize that identifying individual terms as being the same presupposes the concept of sameness of meaning, in relation to which the individual terms can be identified. Thus commonality is not due simply to a term, but requires the formation of concepts on the basis of the mistaken imputation of commonality onto discrete individuals.

What does it mean, however, for a concept to be based on an assumed commonality? Here Dharmakirti’s theory must be placed within its proper context, the apoha or exclusion theory of language, which was created by Dignāga. This complex topic is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say that the apoha theory is a way to explain how language signifies in a world of individuals. Linguistic meaning poses a particularly acute problem for Dignāga and Dharmakirti, for they are committed to a connotationist view of language, in which sense has primacy over reference. Such a view, however, is difficult to hold in a nominalist ontology that disallows abstract entities, such as meaning.

The apoha theory tries to solve this conundrum by arguing that language does not describe reality positively through universals, but negatively by exclusion. Language is primarily meaningful, but this does not mean that there are real senses. Rather, we posit agreed-upon fictions that we construct for the sake of categorizing the world according to our purposes. Thus ‘cow’ does not describe Bessie through the mediation of a real universal (cowness), but by excluding a particular (Bessie) from the class of non-cows. Matilal describes Dignāga’s view this way:

Each name, as Dignāga understands, dichotomizes the universe into two: those to which the name can be applied and those to which it cannot be applied. The function of a name is to exclude the object from the class of those objects to which it cannot be applied. One might say that the function of a name is to locate the object outside of the class of those to which it cannot be applied (Matilal, 1971, p. 45).

Although linguistic form suggests that we subsume an individual under a property, analysis reveals that words merely exclude objects from being included in a class to which they do not belong. The function of a name is to locate negatively an object within a conceptual sphere. The impression that words positively capture the nature of objects is misleading.

This theory was immediately attacked by Hindu thinkers, such as Kumārila and Uddyotakara, who raised strong objections. One of them was that this theory is counterintuitive, because we do not perceive ourselves to eliminate non-cows when we
conceive of cows. Dharmakirti’s theory of concept formation is in many ways an attempt to answer these attacks. It argues that the *apoha* theory is not psychological, but epistemological. In conceiving of objects we do not directly eliminate other objects, but instead rely on a representation that is made to stand in for an assumed commonality shared by several particulars. It is this fictional commonality that is the result of an exclusion. There is nothing over and above particulars, which are categorized on the basis of their being excluded from what they are not. The concept that has been formed in an essentially negative way is projected onto real things. In the process of making judgments such as ‘this is a tree’, the real differences that exist between the different trees come to be ignored and the similarities are reified into a common universal property, which is nothing but a socially agreed-upon fiction.

The eliminative nature of thought and language is psychologically revealed when we examine the learning process. The word ‘cow’, for instance, is not learned only through a definition, but by a process of elimination. We can give a definition of ‘cow’, but the definition works only if its elements are known already. For example, we can define cows as animals having dewlaps, horns, and so on (the traditional definition of ‘cow’ in Indian philosophy). But how do we know what counts as a dewlap? Not just by pointing to the neck of a cow, but by eliminating the cases that do not fit. In this way, we establish a dichotomy between those animals that fit, and other animals or things that do not, and on the basis of this negative dichotomy we construct a fictive property, cowness. This construction is not groundless, however, but proceeds through an indirect causal connection with reality. Concepts are not formed a priori, but elaborated as a result of experiences. Dharmakirti’s solution to the problem of thought and meaning is thus to argue that in a world bereft of real abstract entities (properties), there are only constructed intensional (linguistic) pseudo-entities, but that this construction is based on experience; that is, perception. This grounding in perception ensures that, although conception is mistaken in the way reviewed above, it is neither baseless nor random and hence can lead to the formation of concepts that will be attuned to the causal capacities of particulars.

**Dharmakirti and Abhidharma: Intentionality Revisited**

Dharmakirti’s analysis has in certain respects a great deal of continuity with the Abhidharma. Both view the mind as constituted by a succession of mental states in accordance with their ontological commitments, which privilege the particular over the general. Reality is made up of a plurality of elements (here moments of awareness), and generality, when it is not a figment of our imagination, is at best the result of aggregation. This emphasis on the particular derives from the central tenets of the Buddhist tradition; namely, non-substantiality and dependent origination. In Dharmakirti’s epistemological approach, this emphasis expresses itself in valuing perception over conception, and in the problematic but necessary cooperation between the two forms of cognition. We do not come to know things by merely coming across them, but by integrating them into our conceptual schemes on the basis of our experiences.

One question raised by this analysis concerns intentionality. The Abhidharma tradition had assumed all along that cognitions were intentional, but did not provide a systematic analysis of intentionality. Dharmakirti fills this gap, analyzing the way in which various types of cognition bear on their objects. But because he makes a sharp distinction between perception and conception, his analysis does not yield a single concept of intentionality, but on the contrary leads us to realize that this central notion may have to be understood in multiple ways. The cognitive process starts with our encounter with the world through perceptions, but this encounter is not enough to bring about knowledge. Only when we are able to integrate the objects delivered through the senses into our categorical
schemes can we be said to know them in the full sense of the word. Hence, if we understand intentionality as cognitive — that is, as pertaining to knowledge — we may well have to agree with Dharmakirti that perception is not in and of itself fully intentional. Only when perception is coordinated with conception does it become intentional; hence it can be said to be intentional only in a derived sense of the word. Perception is not in and of itself cognitive, but only inasmuch as it has the ability to induce conceptual interpretations of its objects. This does not mean, however, that perception is completely blank or purely passive. It has an intentional function, that of delivering impressions that we take in and organize through our conceptual schemes. Hence, perception can be said to have a phenomenal intentionality, which may be revealed in certain forms of meditative experiences.

Dharmakirti alludes to such experiences when he describes a form of meditation, in which we empty our mind without closing it completely to the external world (Commentary on Valid Cognition III: 123–5, in Miyasaka 1971–2). In this state of liminal awareness, things appear to us but we do not identify them. We merely let them be. When we come out of this stage, the usual conceptual flow returns, and with it the conceptualization that allows us to identify things as being this or that. This experience shows, Dharmakirti argues, that identification is not perceptual, but is due to conceptualization. In such a state, perception takes place but not conceptualization. Hence, perception is a non-conceptual sensing onto which interpretations are added.

Due to the speed of the mental process, the untrained person cannot differentiate conceptual from non-conceptual cognitions. It is only on special occasions, such as in some form of meditation, that a clear differentiation can be made. There, the flow of thought gradually subsides, and we reach a state in which there is a bare sensing of things. In this state, what we call shapes and colors are seen barely (i.e., as they are delivered to our senses without the adjuncions of conceptual interpretations). When one gradually emerges from such a non-conceptual state, the flow of thoughts gradually reappears, and we are able to make judgments about what we saw during our meditation. One is then also able to make a clear differentiation between the products of thoughts and the bare delivery of the senses and to distinguish cognitive from phenomenal intentionality.

The analysis of intentionality, however, may have to go even further to account for all the forms of cognition known to Buddhist traditions. We alluded above to the Abhidharmic idea of a store-consciousness, a subliminal form of cognition that supports all the propensities, habits, and tendencies of a person. Although such a store-consciousness is usually asserted by the Yogācāra to support their idealist view, it is known to other traditions under other names and hence has to be taken seriously within a Buddhist account of the mind, regardless of the particular views that are associated with it. But given the particularities of this form of consciousness, its integration within a Buddhist view of the mind is not without problems. The difficulties come from the fact that the store-consciousness does not seem to have cognitive or even phenomenal intentionality. Because it does not capture any feature, it cannot be said to know its object, like conceptions. Because it is subliminal, it is difficult to attribute to it a phenomenal content able to induce categorization, like perceptions. How then can it be intentional?

To respond to this question would necessitate an analysis that goes well beyond the purview of this chapter. Several avenues are open to us. We could argue that the store-consciousness is not intentional and hence that intentionality is not the defining characteristic of the mental, but only of certain forms of cognitions. We would then be faced with the task of explaining the nature of the mental in a way that does not presuppose intentionality. Or we could extend the concept of intentionality, arguing that the store-consciousness is not intentional in the usual cognitive or phenomenal senses of the word, but rather that its intentionality consists in its having a dispositional ability to generate more explicit cognitive states. Some Western phenomenologists, notably Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty, distinguish 'object directed intentionality' from 'operative intentionality' (see Chapter 4). Whereas the former is what we usually mean by intentionality, the latter is a non-reflective tacit sensibility, a spontaneous and involuntary level that makes us ready to respond cognitively and affectively to the world, though it is not by itself explicitly cognitive. This most basic form of intentionality is important in explaining our openness to the world. It also seems an interesting avenue for exploring the cognitive nature of the store-consciousness.

Conclusion

We can now see the richness and the complexities of the Indian Buddhist analyses of the nature of the mind and consciousness. The Abhidharma provides the basis of these analyses, with its view of the mind as a stream of moments of consciousness and its distinction between the primary factor of awareness and mental factors. This tradition also emphasizes the intentional nature of consciousness, the ability of consciousness to be about something else. As we have seen, however, this concept is far from self-evident and needs further philosophical clarification. This clarification is one of the important tasks of Dharmakirti’s philosophy. In accomplishing this task, Dharmakirti critically explores the variety of human cognitions, distinguishing the conceptual from the perceptual modes of cognition and emphasizing the constructed nature of the former and its close connection with language. Yet, as we have also seen, this philosophy is not always able to account for all the insights of the Abhidharma, particularly those concerning the deeper layers of consciousness.

When we look at the Indian Buddhist tradition, we should not look for a unified and seamless view of the mind. Like any other significant tradition, Indian Buddhist philosophy of mind is plural and animated by debates, questions, and tensions. This rich tradition has a great deal to offer contemporary mind science and philosophy, including rich phenomenological investigations of various aspects of human cognition and exploration of various levels and types of meditative consciousness. This tradition also shows, however, that it would be naïve to take these investigations of consciousness as being objectively given or established. Rather, they are accounts of experience that are often intertwined with doctrinal formulations and hence are open to critique, revision, and challenge, like any other human interpretation. Indeed, these formulations need to be taken seriously and examined with the kind of critical spirit and rigorous philosophical thinking exhibited by Dharmakirti. Only then, can we do justice to the insights of this tradition.

Glossary

*Sāṃkhya*

Pradhāna: primordial nature or prakṛti, materiality. The primordial substance out of which the diversity of phenomena arise. It is composed of three qualities (guṇa): sattva (transparency, buoyancy), rajas (energy, activity), and tamas (inertia, obstruction). They are the principles or forces whose combination produces mental and material phenomena.

Atman: spiritual self or puruṣa, person. The non-material spiritual element that merely witnesses the mental activities involved in the ordinary awareness of objects.

Buddhi: usually translated as ‘the intellect’. It has the ability to distinguish and experience objects. This ability provides the prereflective and presubjective ground out of which determined mental states and their objects arise. It is also the locus of all the fundamental predispositions that lead to these experiences.

Ahaṃkāra: egoity or ego-sense. This is the sense of individual subjectivity or selfhood tied to embodiment, which gives rise to the subjective pole of cognition.
Manas: mentation. It oversees the senses and discriminates between objects. By serving as an intermediary between the intellect and the senses, mentation organizes sensory impressions and objects and integrates them into a temporal framework created by memories and expectations.

Citta: mental activities or antahkarana, internal organ. This is the grouping of buddhi, ahankara, and manas.

Pramana: instrument of valid cognition of the self. The Sankhya recognizes three such instruments: perception, inference, and testimony. The Nyaya adds a fourth one, analogy.

Buddhist

Citta: primary factor of awareness or vijnana, consciousness. It is the aspect of the mental state that is aware of the object, or the bare apprehension of the object. It is the awareness that merely discerns the object, the activity of cognizing the object.

Caitesika: mental factor. Mental factors are aspects of the mental state that characterize the object of awareness and account for its engagement. In other words, whereas consciousness makes known the mere presence of the object, mental factors make known the particulars of the content of awareness, defining the characteristics and special conditions of its object.

Alaya-vijnana: store-consciousness. This continuously present subliminal consciousness is posited by some of the Yogacara thinkers to provide a sense of continuity in the person over time. It is the repository of all the basic habits, tendencies, and propensities (including those that persist from one life to the next) accumulated by the individual.

Bhavanga citta: life-constituent consciousness. Although this consciousness is not said to be always present and arises only during the moments where there is no manifest mental activity, it also provides a sense of continuity for the Theravada school, which asserts its existence.

Klisha-manas: afflictive mentation. This is the inborn sense of self that arises from the apprehension of the store-consciousness as being a self. From a Buddhist point of view, however, this sense of self is fundamentally mistaken. It is a mental imposition of unity where there is in fact only the arising of a multiplicity of interrelated physical and mental events.

Pramana: valid cognition. Not the instrument of a self but the knowledge-event itself. There are only two types of valid cognition admissible in Buddhist epistemology, pratyaksa, perception, and anumana, inference.

Svasamvedana: self-cognition. This is the limited but intuitive presence that we feel we have toward our own mental episodes, which is due not to the presence of a metaphysical self but to the non-thematic reflexive knowledge that we have of our own mental states. Because self-cognition does not rely on reasoning, it is taken to be a form of perception. It does not constitute, however, a separate reflective or introspective cognition. Otherwise, the charge that the notion of apperception opens an infinite regress would be hard to avoid.

Notes

1. Presenting the Sankhya view in a few lines is problematic given its evolution over a long period of time, an evolution shaped by the addition of numerous refinements and new analyses in response to the critiques of Buddhists and Vedantins. For a quick summary, see Mahalingam (1977). For a more detailed examination, see Larson and Bhattacharya (1987).

2. Contrary to Vedanta, the Sankhya holds that there are many individual selves rather than a universal ground of being such as Brahman.
3. The notion of a pure and passive ‘witness consciousness’ is a central element of many Hindu views about consciousness (see Gupta, 1998, 2003).
4. For a thoughtful discussion of this view of the mind, see Schweizer (1993).
5. Numerous translations of Patañjali’s *Yoga Sūtras* are available in English.
7. For a glimpse of the origins of the Abhidharma, see Gethin (1992).
8. For Husserl, by contrast, not all consciousness is intentional in the sense of being object-directed. See Chapter 4 and the final section of this chapter.
9. All quotations from this work are translated from the French by G. Dreyfus.
10. See Rahula (1980, p. 17). Although the Theravāda Abhidharma does not recognize a distinct store-consciousness, its concept of *bhavacga citta*, the life-constituent consciousness, is similar. For a view of the complexities of the *bhavacga*, see Waldron (2003, pp. 81–87).
11. They are then said to be conjoined (*sampayutta, mtshungs ldan*), in that they are simultaneous and have the same sensory basis, the same object, the same aspect or way of apprehending this object, and the same substance (the fact that there can be only one representative of a type of consciousness and mental factor at the same time). See Waldron (2003, p. 205).
12. This list, which is standard in the Tibetan tradition, is a compilation based on Asaṅga’s *Abhidharma–samuccaya*. It is not, however, Asaṅga’s own list, which contains 52 items (Rahula 1980, p. 7). For further discussion, see Napper (1980) and Rabten (1978/1992). For the lists of some of the other traditions, see Bodhi (1993, pp. 76–79) and de la Vallée Poussin (1971, II: 150–178).
13. Although some of these states may be soteriologically significant and involve the ability to transcend duality, not all need be. The practice of concentration can involve signless meditative states, and so too does the practice of some of the so-called formless meditative states.
14. For a discussion of whether compassion and lovingkindness, seen from a Buddhist point of view, are emotions, see Dreyfus (2002).
15. For a brief but thoughtful discussion of the idea of Buddhism as a psychology, see Gomez (2004).
18. For more on this difficult topic, see Dreyfus (1997) and Dunne (2004).

References


